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498 SEFFERT v. Los ANGELES TRANSIT LINES [56 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 26201. In Bank. Aug. 17, 1961.] 
YETTA SEFFERT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOS 
ANGELES TRANSIT LINES et aI., Defendants and 
Appellants. 
[1] Negligence - Res Ipsa Loquitur - Prerequisites. - Superior 
knowledge by defendant is not a prerequisite for application 
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
[21 ld.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Limitations of Doctrine.-Plaintiff's 
participation in the events leading to an accident does not pre-
clude application of res ipsa loquitur if there is evidence that 
her negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the 
accident. 
[3] Carriers-Passengers-Instructions-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In 
an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when the doors 
of the bus she was attempting to enter suddenly closed and 
the bus started, dragging her some distance and then throwing 
her to the pavement, that part of an instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur stating that defendant must present evidence to show 
either a satisfactory explanation of the accident in which there 
is no negligence on the part of defendant, or such care on 
defendant's part as leads to the conclusion that the accident 
did not happen because of want of care by him, but was due 
to some other cause although the exact cause lllay be unknown, 
was not objectionable as shifting the burden of proof by re-
quiring defendants to prove that they were not negligent where, 
when read as a whole, the instructions correctly stated the 
law that if defendants were to prevail they must rebut the 
res ipsa loquitur inference with evidence of as convincing force. 
[4] ld. - Passengers - Instructions - Res Ipsa Loquitur. - In an 
action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when the doors of the 
bus she was attempting to enter suddenly closed and the bus 
started, dragging her some distance and then throwing her to 
the pavement, the court did not err in failing to caution the 
jury that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine can be invoked only 
if the jury finds that the incident occurred as claimed by 
plaintiff and that plaintiff's negligence was not a contributory 
proximate cause, where defendant did not request such a 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 307 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negli-
gence, § 295 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 59 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 133; [2] Negligence, 
§ 135; [3, 4] Carriers, § 151; [5] Witnesses, § 43; [6, 11) Dam-
ages, § 100; [7] Damages, § 86; [8-10] Damages, § 87; (12) Appeal 
and Error, §§ 195, 1089. 
) 
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cautionary instruction and the subject was covered by other 
instructions that res ipsa loquitur applies "if and only in the 
event" the jury should find that plaintiff was a passenger, 
.that plaintiff was not a passenger unless she entered the bus 
when it was reasonably prudent to do so, and that the jury 
should return a verdict for defendant if it found that plaintiff 
was contributively negligent. 
r6] Witnesses-Infanta-Exam;nation.-!n an action for injuries 
sustained by plaintiff while attempting to board a bus, the 
court did not commit prejudicial misconduct in conducting the 
examination of a 9-year-old witness where, because of her 
tender years, the court conducted the initial examination, and, 
in a sympathetic, impartial and commendable manner, elicited 
relevant testimony, and nearly all of the court's questions 
were asked without objection and defendants were given full 
opportunity to cross-examine. 
[6] Damages-Excessive Damages-Damages Held Not Excessive. 
-An award of $187,903.75 to a 42-year-old passenger injured 
when boarding an autobus was not excessive where she was 
single, had been self-J;upporting for 20 years, the main 
arteries and nerves to her left foot were completely severed 
at the ankle, the main blood vessel supplying blood to that 
foot had to be tied off, with the result that there was per-
manent stoppage of the main blood source, the heel and shin 
bones were fractured, the injuries were extremely painful 
and resulted in a permanently raised left heel, the foot was 
not only permanently deformed but had a persistent open 
ulcer on the beel, plaintiff bad undergone nine operations 
since tbe accident involving skin grafting and other painful 
procedures, bad difficulty standing after returning to work 
and had to lie down frequently, and there was substantial 
evidence to support plaintiff's estimate that ber total pecuniary 
loss, past and future, amounted to $53,903.75, and her claim 
for pain and suO"l'ring-, PllRt and future, amounted to $134,000. 
[7] Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by 'l'rial 
Court.-The amount of damages is a fact question, first com-
mitted to the discretion of the jury and next to tbe discretion 
of the trial judge on a motion for new trial. Since tbey see 
and hear the witnesses and frequently see the injury and im-
pairment that has resulted, all presumptions are in favor of 
the decision of the trial court. 
[8] Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by Appel-
late Courts.-An appellate court can interfere on the ground 
that a judgment is excessive only on the ground that the ver-
dict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 227. 
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and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part 
of the jury. 
r91 Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by Appel-
late Courts. - There are no fixed or absolute standards by 
, which an appellate court can measure in monetary terms the 
extent of the damages suffered by plaintiff as a result of de-
fendant's wrongful act, its duty being to uphold the jury and 
trial judge whenever possible. The amount to be awarded is 
a matter on'which there legitimately may be a wide difference 
of opinion, and in considering a contention that the damages 
are excessive the appellate court must determine every conflict 
in respondent's favor and give him the benefit of every infer-
ence reasonably to be drawn from the record. 
[10] Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by Ap-
pellate Courts.-While an appellate court should consider the 
amounts of damages awarded in prior cases for similar in-
juries, each case must be decided on its own facts and cir-
cumstances. Injuries are seldom identical and the amount 
of pain and suffering involved in similar physical injuries 
varies widely. Basically, the question that should be decided 
by appellate courts is whether or not the verdict is so out of 
line with reason that it shocks the conscience and necessarily 
implies that the verdict must have been the result of passion 
and prejudice. 
[11] Id. - Excessive Damages - Damages Held Not Excessive. -
Where the nonpecuniary items of damage suffered by a 42-year-
old passenger when boarding an autobus included allowances 
for pain and suffering, past and future, humiliation as a result 
of being disfigured and being permanently crippled, and con-
stant anxiety and fear that the leg would have to be ampu-
tated, the $134,000 award for such items, though high and 
perhaps more than the Supreme Court would bave awarded 
were it the trier of the facts, was not as a matter of law su 
high as to shock the conscience and give rise to the presumption 
that it was the result of passion or prejudice on the part of 
the jurors. 
[12] Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel: Waiver of Right to 
Urge Error. - Alleged prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's 
counsel in arguing to the jury in a personal injury case that 
damages for pain and suffering could be fixed by means of a 
mathematical formula predicated on a per diem allowance for 
such item of damages could not be raised on appeal where 
defendants' counsel did not object, -assign the argument as 
misconduct or ask that the jury be admonished to disregard 
it, and where defendants' counsel, by also adopting a mathe-
matical formula type of argument, must be deemed to have 
waived the right to urge such error. 
) 
! 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Alfred Gitelson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plain-
tiff while attempting to board defendants' bus. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed. 
Harry M. Hunt and David S. Smith for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Irving H. Green, Wright, Wright, Goldwater & Mack, 
John H. Rice and Andrew J . Weisz· for Plaintiff and Re-
spondent. 
PETERS, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment for 
plaintiff for $187,903.75 entered on a jury verdict. Their 
motion for a new trial for errors of law and excessiveness of 
damages was denied. 
At the trial plaintiff contended that she was properly en-
tering defendants' bus when the doors closed suddenly catch-
ing her right hand and left foot. The bus started, dragged her 
some distance, and then threw her to the pavement. De-
fendants contended that the injury resulted from plaintiff's 
own negligence, that she was late for work and either ran 
into the side of the bus after the doors had closed or ran 
after the bus and attempted to enter after the doors had nearly 
closed. 
The evidence supports plaintiff's version of the facts. Sev-
eral eyewitnesses testified that plaintiff started to board the 
bus while it was standing with the doors wide open. Defend-
ants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. They do 
contend, however, that prejudicial errors were committed 
during the trial and that the verdict is excessive. 
There Was no Prejudicial Error on the 
Issue of Liability 
Defendants contend that the court erred in giving instruc-
tions on res ipsa loquitur on the ground that the doctrine is 
inapplicable when, as in this case, the defendant does not 
possess superior knowledge concerning the accident or when, 
as in this case, the plaintiff plays an active part in the events 
leading to it. There is no merit in this contention. [1 J Su-
perior knowledge by the defendant is not a prerequisite for 
the application of the doctrine. (Lec! v. Union Pac. R.R. 00., 
25 Cal.2d 605, 619-620 [155 P.2d 42, 158 A.L.R. 1008]; see 
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Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Oalifornia, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 183, 
202-204.) [2 ] Nor does participation by the plaintiff in the 
events leading to the accident preclude its application if there> 
is evidence that plaintiff's negligence, if any, was not a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. (Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 
.. 50 Ca1.2d 153, 157 [323 P.2d 391]; Zentz v. Ooca Oola Bottling 
00., 39 Ca1.2d 436, 444 [247 P.2d 344] ; see Fleming, Torts, 
299.) 
[3] Defendants contend that the instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur erroneously shifted the burden of proof by requiring 
them to prove that they were not negligent. The instruction 
stated that if and only if plaintiff was a passenger as defined 
by prior instructions then "from the happening of the acci· 
dent ... an inference arises that a proximate cause of the 
occurrence was some negligent conduct on the part of de-
fendant. That inference is a form of evidence1 and unless 
there is contrary evidence sufficient to meet or balance it, 
the jury should find in accordance with the inference .... 
In order to meet or balance the inference of negligence, the 
defendant must present evidence to show either (1) a satis-
factory explanation of the accident, in which there is no 'IIegli-
ge'llce on the part of defendant, or (2) such care on the de-
fendant's part as leads to the conclusion that the accident 
did not happen because of tvant of care by him, but was due 
to some other cause, although the exact cause may be unknown. 
If such evidence has at least as much convincing force as the 
inference and other evidence, if any, supporting the inference, 
then you will find against the plaintiff on that issue. " (Italics 
added.) 
Defendants quote the italicized part of the foregoing in-
struction out of context to support their contention that the 
instruction shifted the burden of proof. Read as a whole 
the instructions correctly state the law of California that if 
defendants are to prevail they must rebut the res ipsa loquitur 
inference with evidence of as convincing force. (Hardin v. 
San Jose Oity Lines, Inc., 41 Ca1.2d 432, 437 [260 P.2d 63] ; 
Burr v. Sherwin Williams 00.,42 Ca1.2d 682, 691 [268 P.2d 
1041]; Williams v. Oity of Long Beach, 42 Ca1.2d 716, 718 
[268 P.2d 1061].) 
[ 4] Defendants also contend that the court erred in 
failing to caution the jury tllat the doctrine can be invoked 
'CI. Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d 457, 465 [126 P.2d 868]; McBame, 
IfilereflDeB, Are They E'llidence, 31 Cal.L.Rev. 108, 112. 
) 
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only if the jury finds that the incident occurred as claimed 
by plainti1f and that plainti1f's negligence was not a contribu-
tory proximate cause. (Hardin v. San Jose Oity Lines, Inc., 
BtLpra,41 Cal.2d 432, 435.) Defendants did not request such 
a cautionary instruction. Moreover the subject was covered 
by other instructions. 
The court instructed the jury that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applies "if and only in the event" the jury should 
find that plaintiff was a passenger. Under the court's defi-
nition plaintiff was not a passenger unless she entered the 
bus when it was reasonably prudent to do SO.2 In effect the 
instruction stated that the doctrine did not apply if the jury 
believed that the accident happened as defendants contended. 
Furthermore, the jury was instructed to return a verdict for 
defendants if it found that plainti1f was contributively negli-
gent. There is, therefore, implied in the verdict a finding that 
the accident occurred as described by plainti1f rather than as 
described by defendants. 
[Ii] There is no merit in defendants' contention that the 
court committed prejudicial misconduct in conducting the 
examination of a 9-year-old witness. Because of her tender 
years the court conducted the initial examination, and, in a 
sympathetic, impartial, and commendable manner, elicited 
relevant testimony. Nearly all of the court's questions were 
asked without objection and defendants were given full oppor-
tunity to cross-examine. 
None of the other claimed errors on the issue of liability, 
all minor in nature, bas merit. 
8rJ.'he court stated that the paBsenger relationship WaB established 
"when: (1) a person who intends in good faith and is prepared to be· 
eome a paB8enger, has arrived at a place, which has been designated 
by custom or notice of the carrier aB a site from which the earrier will 
take on passengers, and (2), the person stands alongside or ncar the 
probable stopping place of the bus, or approaches and goes toward and 
arrives close to the entrance doors of the bus standing at the site to 
receive paBsengers, or otherwise had indieated to the bus driver her 
intention to board the bus; and (8), the bus driver takes or has taken 
lome action which indicates the immediate acceptance by the carrier of 
such person as a passenger, and in this respect the stopping by a bus 
driver of a bus of a carrier, at a site, as site is hereinbefore defined, for 
the purpose of taking on passengers and the opening by the bus driver 
of the entrance doors of the bus to receive IUch persons indicates the 
willingness, intention and readiness of the carrier to accept such person 
as a passenger; and (8) [sic] when it being reasonably prudent 80 to do 
the person makes her first contact with the bus in the act of entering it 
or in any event when she gains entrance to the bus .••• " (Italics 
added.) It is not necessary to decide whether the foregoing instruction 
defines a passenger too narrowly, for any error in this respect favors 
defendant&. 
) 
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The Damages Were Not Excessive 
[6] One of the major contentions of defendants is that 
the damages are excessive. as a matter of law. There is no 
merit to this contention . 
. The evidence most favorable to the plaintifi shows that 
prior to the accident plaintiff was in good health, and had 
suffered no prior serious injuries. She was single, and had 
been self-supporting for 20 of her 42 years. The accident 
happened on October 11, 1957. The trial took place in July 
and August of 1959. 
As already pointed out, the injury occurred when plaintiff 
was caught in the doors of defendants' bus when it started 
up before she had gained full entry. As a result she was 
dragged for some distance. The record is uncontradicted that 
her injuries were serious, painful, disabling and permanent. 
The major injuries were to plaintiff's left foot. The main 
arteries and nerves leading to that foot, and the posterior 
tibial vessels and nerve of that foot, were completely severed 
at the ankle. The main blood vessel which supplies blood to 
that foot had to be tied off, with the result that there is a 
permanent stoppage of the main blood source. The heel and 
shin bones were fractured. There were deep lacerations and 
an avulsion' which involved the skin and soft tissue of the 
entire foot. 
These injuries were extremely painful. They have resulted 
in a permanently raised left heel, which is two inches above 
the floor level, caused by the contraction of the ankle joint 
capsule. Plaintifi is crippled and will suffer pain for life.' 
Although this pain could, perhaps, be alleviated by an opera-
tive fusion of the ankle, the doctors considered and rejected 
this procedure because the area has been deprived of its 
normal blood supply. The foot is not only permanently de-
formed but has a persistent open ulcer on the heel, there 
being a continuous drainage from the entire area. Medical 
care of this foot and ankle is to be reasonably expected for 
the remainder of plaintiff's life. 
Since the accident, and because of it, plaintifi has under-
gone nine operations and has spent eight months in various 
hospitals and rehabilitation centers. These operations involved 
painful skin grafting and other painful procedures. One in-
eDe1lDed in Webster'. New International Dictionary (Sd ed.) as • 
•• tearing asunder; forcible .eparation." 
"Her lite upectanc,. 11'88 34.9 ,.earl from the time of trial. 
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volved the surgical removal of gangrenous skin leaving pain-
ful raw and open :flesh exposed from the heel to the toe. 
Another involved a left lumbar sympathectomy in which 
plaintiff's abdomen was entered to sever the nerves affecting 
the remaining blood vessels of the left leg in order to force 
those blood vessels to remain open at all times to the maximum 
extent. Still another operation involved a cross leg :flap graft 
of skin and tissue from plaintiff's thigh which required that 
her left foot be brought up to her right thigh and held at 
this painful angle, motionless, and in a cast for a month until 
the :flap of skin and fat, partially removed from her thigh, 
but still nourished there by a skin connection, could be 
grafted to the bottom of her foot, and until the host site could 
develop enough blood vessels to support it. Several future 
operations of this nature may be necessary. One result of this 
operation was to leave a defective area of the thigh where the 
normal fat is missing and the muscles exposed, and the local 
nerves are missing. This condition is permanent and dis-
figuring. 
Another operation called a d~bridement, was required. This 
involved removal of many small muscles of the foot, much 
of the fat beneath the skin, cleaning the end of the severed 
nerve, and tying off the severed vein and artery. 
The ulcer on the heel is probably permanent, and there is 
the constant and real danger that osteomyelitis may develop 
if the infection extends into the bone. If this happens the 
heel bone would have to be removed surgically and perhaps 
the entire foot amputated. 
Although plaintiff has gone back to work, she testified that 
Rhe has difficulty standing, walking or even sitting, and must 
lie down frequently; that the leg is still very painful; that 
she can, even on her best days, walk not over three blocks 
and that very slowly; that her back hurts from walking; 
that she is tired and weak; that her sleep is disturbed; that 
she has frequent spasms in which the leg shakes uncon-
trollably; that she feels depressed and unhappy, and suffers 
humiliation and embarrassment. 
Plaintiff claims that there is evidence that her total pecuni-
ary loss, past and future, amounts to $53,903.75. This was the 
figure used by plaintiff's counsel in his argument to the jury, 
in which he also claimed $134,000 for pain and suffering, past 
and future. Since the verdict was exactly the total of these 
two estimates, it is reasonable to assume that the jury accepted 
the amount proposed by counsel for each item. (Braddock v 
) 
) 
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Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. (Fla., 1955), 80 So.2d 662, 
665.) 
The summary of plaintUf as to pecuniary loss, past and 
future, is as follows: 
.Doctor and Hospital Bills ..••..••..• $10,330.50 
Drugs and other medical expenses 
stipulated to in the amount of. . • . . . 2,273.25 
Loss of earnings from time of 
accident to time of trial........... 5,500.00 $18,103.75 
Future Medical Expenses: 
$2,000 per year for next 10 years. . .. 20,000.00 
$200 per year for the 24 years 
thereafter ........••..•.•..•... 4,800.00 
Drugs for 34 years............... 1,000.00 
Possible future loss of earnings •••••• 





There is substantial evidence to support these estimates. The 
amounts for past doctor and hospital bills, for the cost of 
drugs, and for a past loss of earnings, were either stipulated 
to, evidence was offered on, or is a simple matter of calculation. 
These items totaled $18,103.75. While the amount of $25,800 
estimated as the cost of future medical expense, for loss of 
future earnings and for the future cost of drugs, may seem 
high, there was substantial evidence that future medical 
expense is certain to be high. There is also substantial evidence 
that plaintiff's future earning capacity may be substantially 
impaired by reason of the injury. The amounts estimated for 
t hose various items are not out of line, and find support in 
the evidence. 
This leaves the amount of $134,000 presumably allowed for 
the nonpecuniary items of damage, including pain and su1fer-
ing, past and future. It is this allowance that defendants 
seriously attack as being excessive as a matter of law. 
It must be remembered that the jury fixed these damages, 
and that the trial judge denied a motion for new trial, one 
ground of which was excessiveness of the award. These deter-
minations are entitled to great weight. [7] The amount 
of damages is a fact question, first committed to the discre-
tion of the jury and next to the discretion of the trial 
judge on a motion for new trial. They see and hear the 
witnesses and frequently, as in this case, see the injury and 
) 
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the impairmp-nt that has resulted therefrom. As a result, 
all presumptions are in favor of the decision of the trial 
court (McOhristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249, 263 [171 
P.2d 85]). [8] The power of the appellate court differs 
materially from that of the trial court in passing on this 
question. An appellate court can interfere on the ground that 
the judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict 
is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and 
suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the 
jury. The proper rule was stated in Holmes v. Southern Cal. 
Edison 00., 78 Cal.App.2d 43, 51 [177 P.2d 32], as follows: 
"The powers and duties of a trial judge in ruling on a motion 
for new trial and of an appellate court on an appeal from 
a judgment are very different when the question of an exces-
sive award of damages arises. The trial judge sits as a 
thirteenth juror with the power to weigh the evidence and 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. If he believes the dam-
ages awarded by the jury to be excessive and the question is 
presented it becomes his duty to reduce them. [Citing cases.] 
When the question is raised his denial of a motion for new 
trial is an indication that he approves the amount of the 
award. An appellate court has no such po,vers. It cannot 
weigh the evidence and pass on the credibility of the witnesses 
as a juror does. To hold an award excessive it must be so 
large as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the 
jurors." In Holder v. Key System, 88 Cal.App.2d 925, 940 
[200 P.2d 98], the court, after quoting the above from the 
Holmes case added: "The question is not what this court 
would have awarded as the trier of the fact, but whether 
this court can say that the award is so high as to suggest 
passion or prejudice." In Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363, 386, 
decided in 1871, there appears the oft-quoted statement that: 
•• The Court will not interfere in such cases unless the amount 
awarded is so grossly excessive as to shock the moral sense, 
and raise a reasonable presumption that the jury was under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. In this case, whilst the 
sum awarded appears to be much larger than the facts 
demanded, the amount cannot be said to be so grossly exces-
sive as to be reasonably imputed only to passion or prejudice 
in the jury. In such cases there is no accurate standard by 
which to compute the injury, and the jury must., necessarily, 
be left to the exercise of a wide discretion; to be restricted by 
the Court only when the sum awarded is so large that the 
verdict shocks the moral sense, and raises a presumption that 
l 
I 
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it must havc proceeded from passion or prejudice." This 
same rule was announced in Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 
76 [181 P.2d 645], where it was stated that it "is not the 
function of a reviewing court to interfere with a jury's award 
of damages unless it is so grossly disproportionate to any 
reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the facts that 
it shocks the court's sense of justice and raises a presumption 
that it was the result of passion and prejudice." (See also 
Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Conc1'efe Co.,49 Cal.2d 483, 488 [319 
P.2d 343] ; Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 44 Cal.2d 343, 
359 [282 P.2d 23, 51 A.L.R.2d 107]; Zibbell v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 160 Cal. 237, 255 [116 P. 513].) 
[9] There are no fixed or absolute standards by which 
an appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent 
of the damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the 
wrongful act of the defendant. The duty of an appellate 
court is to uphold the jury and trial judge whenever possible. 
(Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan, 219 Cal. 184, 192 
[25 P.2d 839, 91 A.L.R. 1357].) The amount to be awarded 
is "a matter on which there legitimately may be a wide differ-
ence of opinion" (Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal.2d 820,823 [172 
P.2d 353]). In considering the contention that the damages 
are excessive the appellate court must determine every con-
flict in the evidence in respondent's favor, and must give him 
the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from the 
record (Kimic v. San Jose-Los Gatos etc. Ry. Co., 156 Cal. 
273,277 [104 P. 312]). 
[ 10] While the appellate court should consider the 
amounts awarded in prior cases for similar injuries, obviously, 
each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. 
Such examination demonstrates that such awards vary great-
ly. (See exhaustive annotations in 16 A.L.R.2d 3, and 16 
A.L.R.2d 393.) Injuries are seldom identical and the amount 
of pain and suffering involved in similar physical injuries 
varies widely. These factors must be considered. (Leming v. 
Oilfields Trucking Co., supra, 44 Ca1.2d 343, 356; Crane v. 
Smith, 23 Cal.2d 288, 302 [144 P.2d 356].) Basically, the 
question that should be decided by the appellate courts is 
whether or not the verdict is so out of line with reason that 
it shocks the conscience and necessarily implies that the 
verdict must have been the result of passion and prejudice. 
[11] In the instant case, the nonpecuniary items of dam-
age include allowances for pain and suffering, past and future, 
humiliation as a result of being disfigured and being per-
) 
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manently crippled, and constant anxiety and fear that the 
leg will have to be amputated. While the amount of the award 
is high, and may be more than we would have awarded were 
we the trier of the facts, considering the nature of the injury, 
t.he great pain and suffering, past and future, and the other 
. items of damage, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that it 
is so high that it shocks the conscience and gives rise to the 
presumption that it was the result of passion or prejudice on 
the part of the jurors. 
[12] Defendants next complain that it was prejudicial 
error for plaintiff's counsel to argue to the jury that damages 
for pain and suffering could be fixed by means of a mathe-
matical formula predicated upon a per diem allowance for 
this item of damages. The propriety of such an argument 
seems never to have been passed upon in this state. In other 
jurisdictions there is a sharp divergence of opinion on the 
subject. (See anno., 60 A.L.R.2d 1331.) It is not necessary 
to pass on the propriety of such argument in the instant case 
because, when plaintiff's counsel made the argument in ques-
tion, defendants' counsel did not object, assign it as miscon-
duct or ask that the jury be admonished to disregard it. 
Moreover, in his argument to the jury, the defendants' counsel 
also adopted a mathematical formula type of argument. This 
being so, even if such argument were error (a point we do not 
pass upon), the point must be deemed to have been waived, 
and cannot be raised, properly, on appeal. (State Rubbish etc. 
Assn. v. Silunoff. 38 Cal.2d 330, 340 [240 P.2d 282].) 
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Although I agree that there was no prejudicial error on 
the issue of liability, it is my opinion that the award of 
$134,000 for pain and suffering is so excessive as to indicate 
that it was prompted by passion, prejudice, whim, or caprice. 1 
Before the accident plaintiff was employed as a file clerk 
'The award of $53,903.i5 for pecuniary loss, past and future, is also 
8Uspect. The amount awarded for future medical expenses is $12,196.25 
greater than the medical expenses incurred from the time of the accident 
to the time of trial, a period of nearly two years. The amount awarded 
for future loss of earnings is $4,500 greater than plaintiff's past 10s8 
of earnings. Yet· the evidence indicates that plaintiff's medical care 
bas been largely complcted and tbat the future loss of earnings will not 
exceed tbe earnings lost by tbe prolonged stays in the hospital and tho 
rehabilitation center. 
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at a salary of $375 a month. At the time of the trial she had 
returned to her job at the same salary and her foot had 
healed sufficiently for her to walle At the time of the accident 
she was 42 years old with a life expectancy of 34.9 years. 
During closing argument plaintiff's counsel summarized thc 
evidence relevant to past and possible future damages and 
proposed a specific amount for each item. His total of 
$187,903.75 was the exact amount awarded by the jury. 
His proposed amounts were as follows: 
Doctor and Hospital Bills .......... $10,330.50 
Drugs and other medical expenses 
stipulated to in the amount of. . . . 2,273.25 
Loss of earnings from time of 
accident to time of trial. . . . . . . . . . 5,500.00 $ 18,103.75 
l"uture Medical Expenses: 
$2,000 per year for next ten years 20,000.00 
$200 per year for the 24 years 
thereafter ...................• 4,800.00 
Drugs for 34 years. . • . . . . . .. . . . . • 1,000.00 
Possible future loss of earnings ..••• 
Total Pecuniary Loss ..•.......•••• 
Pain and Suffering: 
From time of accident to time of 
trial (660 days) @ $100 a day. . .. 66,000.00 
For the remainder of her life 
(34 years) @ $2,000 a year. . . . . .• 68,000.00 







The jury and the trial court have broad discretion in 
determining the damages in a personal injury case. (Johll$ton 
v. Long, 30 Ca1.2d 54, 76 [181 P.2d 645] ; Roedder v. Rowley, 
28 Ca1.2d 820,823 [172 P.2d 353].) A reviewing court, how-
ever, has responsibilities not only to the litigants in an action 
but to future litigants and must reverse or remit when a jury 
awards either inadequate or excessive damages. (E.g., Clifford 
v. Ruocco, 39 Ca1.2d 327, 329 [246 P.2d 651] [inadequate 
award] ; Torr v. United Railroads, 187 Cal. 505, 509 [202 P. 
671] [inadequate award]; Ckinnis v. POllwna Pump Co., 
36 Cal.App.2d 633,642-643 [98 P.2d 560] [inadequate award] ; 
Bellman v. Sall Francisco H. S. Dist., 11 Ca1.2d 576, 588 [81 
P.2d 894] [excessive award] ; Mondine v. Sarlill, 11 Ca1.2d 
593,600 [81 P.2d 903] [excessive award] ; Lindemann v. San 
Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 5 Ca1.2d 480,510 [55 P.2d 870] [exces-
) 
) 
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sive award] ; Phelps v. Cogswell, 70 Cal. 201,204 [11 P. 628] 
[excessive award].) 
The crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the 
. award of $134.000 for pain and suffering is so excessive it 
must.have resulted from passion, prejudice, whim or caprice. 
"To say that a verdict has been influenced by passion or 
prejudice is but another way of saying that the verdict exceeds 
any amount justified by the evidence." (Z,obell v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 160 Cal. 237, 254 [116 P. 513]; see Doolin v. 
Omntous Cable Co., 125 Cal. 141,144 [57 P. 774].) 
There has been forceful criticism of the .rationale for 
awarding damages for pain and suffering in negligence cases. 
(Morris, Liability for Pain and S·uf/ering, 59 Columb.L.Rev. 
476; Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Ohio L.J. 
200; Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of 
Insurance, 18 Law and Contemporary Problems 219; Zeler-
myel', Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 Syracuse L.Rev. 
27.) Such damages originated under primitive law as a 
means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings 
of those who had been wronged. (Morris, Liability for Pain 
and Suffering, supra, 59 Columb.L.Rev. at p. 478; Jaffe, 
Damages for Personal bljUry: The Impact of Insurance, 
supra, 18 Law and Contemporary Problems at pp. 222-223.) 
They become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a 
mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly distri-
bution of losses through insurance and the price of goods 
or of transportation. mtimately such losses are borne by a 
public free of fault as part of the price for the benefits of 
mechanization. (Cf. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Ca1.2d 
339, 347-848 [5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575] ; Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., a2 N.J. 358 [161 A.2d 69, 77, 75 
A.L.R.2d 1]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 
453, 462 [150 P .2d 436] [concurring opinion] .) 
Nonetheless. this state has long recognized pain and suBer-
ing as elements of damages in negligence cases (Zibbell v. 
Southern Pacific Co., supra, 160 Cal. 237, 250; Roedder v. 
Rowley, supra, 28 Ca1.2d 820, 822) ; any change in this regard 
must await reexamination of the pl'oblem by the Legislature. 
Meanwhile, awards for pain and suffering serve to ease plain. 
tiffs' discomfort and to pay for attorney fees for which plain-
tiffs are not otherwise compensated. 
It would hardly be possible ever to compensate a person 
fully for pain and suffering. "'No rational being would 
. change places with the injured man for an amount of gold 
) 
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that would fill the room of the court, yet no lawyer would 
contend that such is the legal measure of damages.' " (ZibbeU 
. v. Soufkern Pacific Co., supra, 160 Cal. 237, 255; see 2 Harper 
and James, The Law of Torts 1322.) "Translating pain and 
. anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allow-
imce,and not a process of measurement, and consequently the 
judge can, in his instructions give the jury no standard to go 
by; he can only tell them to allow such amount as in their 
discretion they may consider reasonable. • . • The chief reli-
ance for reaching reasonable results in attempting to value 
suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common 
sense of the jury ..•. " (McCormick, Damages, § 88, pp. 318-
319.) Such restraint and common sense were lacking here. 
A review of reported cases involving serious injuries and 
large pecuniary losses reveals that ordinarily the part of the 
verdict attributable to pain and suffering does not exceed 
the part attributable to pecuniary losses. (See 16 A.L.R.2d 
3-390; 18 West Cal.Dig., Damages, §§ 130-132.) The award 
in this case of $134,000 for pain and suffering exceeds not 
only the pecuniary losses but any such award heretofore sus-
tained in this state even in cases involving injuries more 
serious by far than those suffered by plaintiff. (See Leming v. 
Oilfields Trucking Co. (1955), 44 Cal.2d 343, 358 [282 P.2d 
23, 51 A.L.R.2d 107]; Deshotel v. Atchison, T. " S. P. By. 
Co. (1956),144 Cal.App.2d 224,231 [300 P.2d 910] ; McNuZty 
v. Soutkern Pacific Co. (1950), 96 Cal.App.2d 841, 847 [216 
P.2d 534] discussed in Kalven, The Jury and The Damage 
Award,19 Ohio L.J. 158, 170; Sullivan v. City" County of 
San Prancisco (1950), 95 CaJ.App.2d 745, 758-761 [214 P.2d 
82]; Gluckstein v. Lipsett (1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 391, 398 
[209 P.2d 98] ; Huggans v. Southern Pacific Co. (1949), 92 
Cal.App.2d 599, 615 [207 P.2d 864].) In McNulty v. Southern 
Pacific Co., supra, the court reviewed a large number of eases 
involving injuries to legs and feet, in each of which the total 
judgment, including both pecuniary loss and pain and suffer-
ing did not exceed $100,000.2 Although excessive damages is 
"an issue which is primarily factual and is not therefore a 
matter which can be decided upon the basis of awards made 
in other cases" (Leming v. Oilfields Trucking 00., 44 Ca1.2d 
343, 356 [282 P.2d 23, 51 A.L.R.2d 107]; Ortme v. Smith, 
23 Ca1.2d 288, 302 [144 P.2d 356]), awards for sim.nar in-
-rile verdicta ill lOme of these ca8es were over .100,000 IMat ID -.ch 
eaae the awant wu reduced to 1100,000 or 1-. 
) 
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juries may be considered as one factor to be weighed in 
determining whether the damages awarded are excessive. 
(Maede v. Oakland High School Dist., 212 Cal. 419, 425 [298 
P. 987] ; McNulty v. Southern Pacific 00., supra, 96 Cal.App. 
2d 841, 848.) 
The excessive award in this case was undoubtedly the result 
of the improper argument of plaintiff's counsel to the jury. 
Though no evidence was introduced, though none could pos-
sibly be introduced on the monetary value of plaintiff's suffer-
ing, counsel urged the jury to award $100 a day for pain and 
suffering from the time of the accident to the time of trial 
and $2,000 a year for pain and suffering for the remainder 
of plaintiff's life. 
The propriety of counsel's proposing a specific sum for each 
day or month of suffering has recently been considered by 
courts of several jurisdictions. (See 19 Ohio L.J. 780; 33 
So.Cal.L.Rev. 214, 216.) The reasons for and against per-
mitting "per diem argument for pain and suffering" are re-
viewed in Ratner v. Arrington (Fla.App.). 111 So.2d 82, 85-90 
[1959 Florida decision holding such argument is permissible] 
and Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82 [138 A.2d 713, 718-725, 60 
A.L.R.2d 1331] [1958 New Jersey decision holding such argu-
ment to be an "unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the 
jury"]. 
The reason usually advanced for not allowing such argu-
ment is that since there is no way of translating pain and 
suffering into monetary terms, counsel's proposal of a particu-
lar sum for each day of suffering represents an opinion and a 
conclusion on matters not disclosed by the evidence, and tends 
to mislead the jury and result in excessive awards. The reason 
usually advanced for allowing "per diem argument for pain 
and suffering" is that it affords the jury as good an arbitrary 
measure as any for that which cannot be measured. 
Counsel may argue all legitimate inferences from the evi-
dence, but he may not employ arguments that tend primarily 
to mislead the jury. (People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 886 
[346 P.2d 22] ; People v. Johnson, 178 Cal.App.2d 360, 372 
[3 Cal.Rptr. 28] ; Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport 
Oorp., 11 Wis.2d 604 [106 N.W.2d 274, 280] ; Michael and 
Adler, Trial of an Iss1w of Fact, 34 Columb.L.Rev. 1224, 1483-
1484; cf. Rogers v. Fopp ia 110, 23 Cal.App.2d 87, 94-95 [72 
P .2d 239].) A specified sum for pain and suffering for any 
particular period is bound to be conjectural. Positing such a 
sum for a small period of time and then multiplying that sum 
Ie C.M-IT 
